
Italy North TSOs amended proposal for common provisions for regional operational security coordination in accordance with Article 76 of Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/1485 of 2 August 2017 establishing a guideline on electricity transmission system operation

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Whereas

- (1) Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/1485 of 2 August 2017 establishing a guideline on electricity transmission system operation (hereafter referred to as the “SO Regulation”) entered into force on 14 September 2017.
- (2) The Transmission System Operators (hereafter referred to as “TSOs”) of the Italy North Capacity Calculation Region (hereafter referred to as “Italy North CCR”), as defined in accordance with Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 establishing a guideline on Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management (hereafter referred to as the “CACM Regulation”) submitted a proposal for the methodology for regional operational security coordination (hereafter referred to as “ROSC methodology”) inside the Italy North CCR, in accordance with Article 76(1) of the SO Regulation in December 2019.
- (3) On 24 July 2020, the Regulatory Authorities (hereafter referred to as “NRAs”) of the Region reached an agreement to approve the proposal of the ROSC methodology submitted by the TSOs of the regions, introducing some changes in accordance with Article 5(6) of Regulation 2019/942 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators.
- (4) Article 31(5) of the ROSC methodology approved by the NRAs of Italy North CCR foresees that the TSOs shall provide an amended ROSC methodology proposal within 12 months. The TSOs submitted the new version of the ROSC methodology proposal in July 2021. This document represents the new version of the ROSC methodology.
- (5) This ROSC methodology takes into account the principles and goals set out in the SO Regulation, as well as those of the CACM Regulation. Moreover, this ROSC methodology follows the principles set out in the methodology for coordinating operational security analysis (hereafter referred to as “CSAm”) established by the Agency for the cooperation of energy regulators (hereafter referred to as “ACER”) in its decision No 07/2019 and the Amendment of the Methodology for coordinating operational security analysis (hereafter referred to as “Amendment of the CSAm”) established by ACER in its decision No 07/2021.

This methodology takes also into account the effective structure of the grid by establishing TSO-TSO based contractual framework to include Third Countries as Technical Counterparties. Therefore, this methodology takes into account Technical Counterparties' grid elements.

- (6) Ensuring operational security, which is among the objectives listed in Article 4 of the SO Regulation, requires the inclusion of Third Countries' Remedial Actions in the coordinated security analysis processes of Italy North CCR. SO Regulation's objectives cannot be achieved in any other way but by including Third Countries' Remedial Actions. This inclusion is in line with Article 13 of the SO Regulation, providing that EU TSOs must establish “*cooperation concerning secure system operation*” with non-EU TSOs belonging to the same synchronous area via an agreement with these non-EU TSOs. In order to comply with the requirement laid down by EU Regulations, this ROSC methodology includes Third Countries' TSOs as Technical Counterparties.

To ensure operational security by including Third Countries' Remedial Actions, TSOs of Italy North CCR will conclude an agreement with relevant Technical Counterparties. In order to be taken into consideration in the regional operational security coordination, and enter into a TSO-TSO based contractual framework, Technical Counterparties must fulfil the conditions laid down by Article 1(3) of the CSAm, applicable to TSOs from jurisdictions outside the area referred to in Article 2(2) of the SO Regulation. This agreement will include ROSC methodology's provisions and ensure that the Technical Counterparty is contractually bound by the same obligations as the ones binding upon TSOs of the Italy North CCR by virtue of EU Regulations. Such agreement will govern mutual obligations and responsibilities of the Technical Counterparty with TSOs of Italy North CCR in relation to the regional operational security coordination.

- (7) In accordance with Article 76(1) of the SO Regulation, the ROSC methodology “shall determine:
- (a) *conditions and frequency of intraday coordination of operational security analysis and updates to the common grid model by the regional security coordinator;*
 - (b) *the methodology for the preparation of remedial actions managed in a coordinated way, considering their cross-border relevance as determined in accordance with Article 35 of Regulation (EU) 2015/1222, taking into account the requirements in Articles 20 to 23 and determining at least:*
 - (i) *the procedure for exchanging the information of the available remedial actions, between relevant TSOs and the regional security coordinator;*
 - (ii) *the classification of constraints and the remedial actions in accordance with Article 22;*
 - (iii) *the identification of the most effective and economically efficient remedial actions in case of operational security violations referred to in Article 22;*
 - (iv) *the preparation and activation of remedial actions in accordance with Article 23(2);*
 - (v) *the sharing of the costs of remedial actions referred to in Article 22, complementing where necessary the common methodology developed in accordance with Article 74 of Regulation (EU) 2015/1222. As a general principle, costs of non-cross-border relevant congestions shall be borne by the TSO responsible for the given control area and costs of relieving cross-border-relevant congestions shall be covered by TSOs responsible for the control areas in proportion to the aggravating impact of energy exchange between given control areas on the congested grid element.”*
- (8) In accordance with Article 77(1) of the SO Regulation, the ROSC methodology “shall also include common provisions concerning the organisation of regional operational security coordination, including at least:
- (a) *the appointment of the regional security coordinator(s) that will perform the tasks in paragraph 3 for that capacity calculation region;*
 - (b) *rules concerning the governance and operation of regional security coordinator(s), ensuring equitable treatment of all member TSOs;*
 - (c) *where the TSOs propose to appoint more than one regional security coordinator in accordance with subparagraph (a):*
 - (i) *a proposal for a coherent allocation of the tasks between the regional security coordinators who will be active in that capacity calculation region. The proposal shall take full account of the need to coordinate the different tasks allocated to the regional security coordinators;*
 - (ii) *an assessment demonstrating that the proposed setup of regional security coordinators and allocation of tasks is efficient, effective and consistent with the regional coordinated capacity calculation established pursuant to Articles 20 and 21 of Regulation (EU) 2015/1222;*
 - (iii) *an effective coordination and decision making process to resolve conflicting positions between regional security coordinators within the capacity calculation region.”*

- (9) In accordance with Article 77(3) of the SO Regulation, *the TSOs of each capacity calculation region shall propose the delegation of the following tasks in accordance with paragraph 1:*
- (a) *regional operational security coordination in accordance with Article 78 of SO Regulation in order to support TSOs fulfil their obligations for the year-ahead, day-ahead and intraday time-frames in Article 34(3) and Articles 72 and 74 of SO Regulation;*
 - (b) *building of common grid model in accordance with Article 79 of SO Regulation;*
 - (c) *regional outage coordination in accordance with Article 80 of SO Regulation, in order to support TSOs fulfil their obligations in Articles 98 and 100 of SO Regulation;*
 - (d) *regional adequacy assessment in accordance with Article 81 of SO Regulation in order to support TSOs fulfil their obligations under Article 107.*
- (10) This ROSC methodology in accordance with Article 76(1) of the SO Regulation considers and, where necessary, complements the common Italy North methodology for coordinated redispatching and countertrading (hereafter referred to as “RDCT methodology”) proposed by the TSOs of Italy North CCR in accordance with Article 35 of the CACM Regulation and approved by the relevant national regulatory authorities according to Article 9 of CACM Regulation.
- (11) In accordance with Article 35(2) of Regulation 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the internal market for electricity (hereafter referred to as the “Electricity Regulation”), the Regional Coordination Centres (hereinafter referred to as “RCCs”) shall replace the Regional Security Coordinators (hereinafter referred to as “RSCs”) established pursuant to the SO Regulation and shall enter into operation by 1 July 2022. Italy North RCC(s) shall complement the role of TSOs by performing the tasks of regional relevance assigned to them in accordance with Article 37 of the Electricity Regulation: these tasks include the tasks originally assigned to RSCs pursuant to Article 77(3) of SO Regulation.
- (12) The ROSC methodology shall take into account the RCC concept, by foreseeing that the competent RCC shall replace the RSC for the tasks to be delegated according to Article 77(3) of SO Regulation: this allows to have a framework consistent with the Electricity Regulation, avoiding any further amendments when the RCCs become active on 1st July 2022.
- (13) RCC are established for each system operation region (hereinafter referred to as “SOR”), according to a proposal submitted by the competent TSOs pursuant to Article 35 of the Electricity Regulation and approved by the competent NRAs. The system operation regions are proposed by ENTSO-E pursuant to Article 36 of the Electricity Regulation and approved by ACER.
- (14) Italy North CCR is placed in the Central System Operation Region for which CORESO and TSCNET are established as competent RCCs.
- (15) Articles 11 of the SO Regulation require that the ROSC methodology shall be subject to consultation for a duration of not less than one month. The TSOs of Italy North CCR consulted the proposal for this ROSC methodology from 10 June to 10 July 2021 with one response received.
- (16) Article 6(6) of the SO Regulation requires that the proposed timescale for the implementation and the expected impact of the Italy North ROSC methodology on the objectives of the SO Regulation shall be described. The timescale for implementation is detailed in Article 28 of this ROSC methodology Proposal. The impact is presented below (point (17) of this Whereas Section).
- (17) The ROSC methodology contributes and does not in any way hinder the achievement of the objectives of Article 4 of SO Regulation:
- a) Article 4(1)(a) of SO Regulation aims at determining common operational security requirements and principles. The Italy North ROSC methodology serves this objective by introducing common

set of principles to be followed by TSOs and Technical Counterparties in the Region for a coordinated operational security coordination.

- b) Article 4(1)(d) of SO Regulation aims at ensuring the conditions for maintaining operational security throughout the Union. The Italy North ROSC methodology serves this objective by setting out the rules for coordination within the Region considering the amended version of Article 27 of the CSAm.
 - c) Article 4(1)(e) of SO Regulation aims at ensuring the conditions for maintaining a frequency quality level of all synchronous areas throughout the Union. The Italy North ROSC methodology serves this objective since maintaining the operational security is essential (together with the balancing mechanisms) for safeguarding the frequency quality in the interconnected system.
 - d) Article 4(1)(f) of SO Regulation aims at promoting the coordination of system operation and operational planning. The Italy North ROSC methodology serves this objective by setting out rules for the preparation of Remedial Actions to be coordinated, thus extending the scope of coordination also to the operational planning timeframe.
 - e) Article 4(1)(g) of SO Regulation aims at ensuring and enhancing the transparency and reliability of information on transmission system operation. The Italy North ROSC methodology serves this objective by introducing specific provisions for the exchange of necessary information among the TSOs or the Technical Counterparties and the Regional Security Coordinator, and among the Regional Security Coordinators in the Region for achieving the necessary coordination.
 - f) Article 4(1)(h) of SO Regulation aims at contributing to the efficient operation and development of the electricity transmission system and electricity sector in the Union. The Italy North ROSC methodology serves this objective since this specific Region is an integral part of the European interconnected system. Therefore, by safeguarding secure operation in the Region, the overall security is guaranteed, and the markets can function in a way that provides the right incentives for the development of the system and the electricity sector in the Union.
- (18) In conclusion, this ROSC methodology contributes to the general objectives of the SO Regulation.

TITLE 1

General Provisions

Article 1

Subject matter and scope

1. The ROSC methodology as determined in this document is the methodology for regional operational security coordination for Italy North CCR developed in accordance with Article 76 of the SO Regulation. The previous version of the ROSC methodology approved by the national regulatory authorities of Italy North CCR on 24/07/2020 is repealed, but for Title 3 that remains into force till 30th June 2022.
2. In line with the RDCT methodology defined for the same Capacity Calculation Region according to Article 35 of CACM Regulation, Technical Counterparties can be involved in the processes described in this methodology. Technical Counterparties will set up separate contracts, provided that they fulfil the requirements set up in paragraphs 4 and 5.
3. This methodology covers the day-ahead and intraday regional operational security coordination within Italy North CCR. This methodology shall apply to all TSOs, Technical Counterparties and RCC(s) within Italy North CCR.
4. As provided by Article 1(3) of the CSAm, TSOs from jurisdictions outside the area referred to in Article 2(2) of the SO Regulation may participate in the regional operational security coordination on a voluntary basis, provided that:
 - a) for them to do so is technically feasible and compatible with the requirements of the SO Regulation;
 - b) they agree that they shall have the same rights and responsibilities with respect to the coordinated security analysis as the TSOs referred to in paragraph 3;
 - c) they accept any other conditions related to the voluntary nature of their participation in the coordinated security analysis that the TSOs referred to in paragraph 3 may set;
 - d) the TSOs referred to in paragraph 3 have concluded an agreement governing the terms of the voluntary participation with the TSOs referred to in this paragraph;
 - e) once TSOs participating in the regional operational security coordination on a voluntary basis have demonstrated objective compliance with the requirements set out in (a), (b), (c), and (d), the TSOs referred to in paragraph 3, after checking that the criteria in (a), (b), (c), and (d) are met, have approved an application from the TSO wishing to participate on a voluntary basis in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 5(3) of the SO Regulation.
5. The TSOs referred to in paragraph 3 shall monitor that TSOs participating in the regional operational security coordination on a voluntary basis pursuant to paragraph 4 respect their obligations. If a TSO participating in the regional operational security coordination pursuant to paragraph 4 does not respect its essential obligations in a way that significantly endangers the implementation and operation of the SO Regulation, the TSOs referred to in paragraph 3 shall terminate that TSO's voluntary participation in the regional operational security coordination process in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 5(3) of the SO Regulation.

Article 2

Definitions and interpretation

1. For the purposes of this methodology, the terms used shall have the meaning of the definitions included in Article 3 of the SO Regulation, Article 2 of CACM Regulation, Article 2 of the CSAm and the other items of legislation referenced therein. In addition, the following definitions shall apply:

- a) ‘Area of Common Interest’ or ‘ACI’ means the list of critical network elements pursuant to the RDCT methodology;
 - b) ‘CNE’ means Critical Network Element;
 - c) ‘CROSA’ means Coordinated Regional Operational Security Assessment;
 - d) ‘D-2 CCM’ means the common D-2 Italy North capacity calculation methodology developed in accordance with Article 21 of CACM Regulation.
 - e) ‘export corner’ means the scenario of the capacity calculation process performed in D-2 pursuant to D-2 CCC in which TSOs assume commercial export of Italy on at least one of its four northern borders (FR-IT, CH-IT, AT-IT, SI-IT);
 - f) ‘full import scenario’ means the scenario of the capacity calculation process performed in D-2 pursuant to D-2 CCC, in which TSOs assume simultaneous commercial import of Italy on each of its four northern borders (FR-IT, CH-IT, AT-IT, SI-IT);
 - g) ‘ID RSA’ means Intraday Regional Security Analysis;
 - h) ‘Ordered Remedial Action’ means an agreed Remedial Action which cannot be reassessed in the following operational security assessment considering the lead time required for its activation;
 - i) ‘Remedial Action’ or ‘RA’ means any measure or combination of measures applied by a TSO or several TSOs, manually or automatically, in order to maintain operational security
 - j) ‘Requester of RA’ means the TSO owning the element for which a RA needs to be activated;
 - k) ‘RAO’ means Remedial Action Optimisation;
 - l) ‘Technical Counterparty’ means any non-EU TSO to be included in procedures of this methodology through respective agreements;
 - m) ‘APG’ is the Austrian Transmission System Operator;
 - n) ‘ELES’ is the Slovenian Transmission System Operator;
 - o) ‘RTE’ is the French Transmission System Operator;
 - p) ‘Terna’ is the Italian Transmission System Operator.
2. Potential categories of RAs shall be classified in accordance with Article 22 of the SO Regulation.
 3. Where this Methodology refers to grid elements, it includes HVDC systems.
 4. ‘IGM’, ‘CGM’ and ‘regional CSA’ respectively stand for ‘individual grid model’, ‘common grid model’ and ‘Coordinated Regional Operational Security Assessment’ defined in Article 2 of the CSAm.
 5. In this methodology, RCC shall be intended as RSC until their establishment on 1st of July 2022.
 6. In this methodology, unless the context requires otherwise:
 - a) the singular indicates the plural and vice versa;
 - b) the headings are inserted for convenience only and do not affect the interpretation of this ROSC methodology;
 - c) references to an “Article” are, unless otherwise stated, references to an Article of this ROSC methodology;
 - d) references to a “paragraph” are, unless otherwise stated, references to a paragraph included in the same Article of this ROSC methodology where it is mentioned; and
 - e) any reference to legislation, regulations, directives, orders, instruments, codes or any other enactment shall include any modification, extension or re-enactment of it when in force.

TITLE 2
Provisions for regional operational security coordination

Chapter 1
General provisions for regional operational security coordination

Article 3
Detection of the constraints in regional CSA

1. When performing day-ahead and intraday regional CSA, TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties shall detect if power flows exceed thermal limits on the XNEs and scanned elements of the Region.
2. To detect other constraints (such as voltage violations, violations of short-circuit thresholds or violations of stability limits) each TSO of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparty will perform Local Preliminary Assessment and long-term operational security analyses according to Article 31, 38 and 73 of the SO Regulation.
3. After the process according to the all TSOs' proposal for a common grid model methodology in accordance with Articles 67(1) and 70(1) of SO Regulation is fully implemented, the TSOs will assess the possibility to detect other constraints directly in the day-ahead and intraday regional CSA.

Article 4
Definition of the secured area and scanned elements

1. The secured area consists of all the XNEs of Italy North CCR.
2. The XNEs shall include at least all the elements with a voltage level equal or above 220 kV included in the IGM provided by each TSO of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparty. The XNEs can include elements below 220 kV voltage level if these elements are included in the IGM according to the provisions set in the methodology for building day-ahead and intraday common grid models in accordance with Article 70 of SO Regulation.
3. Each TSO of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparty have the right to delete from the regional list of the XNEs any network element, provided it is not a CNE of Italy North Region and the removal is commonly agreed by all TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties.
4. If an element is a XNE in another CCR, it can be considered a XNE for Italy North CCR and included in the secured area of this CCR only if it is defined as an overlapping XNE according to the CSAm.
5. The scanned elements shall be network elements on which XRAs activated during the Coordinated Regional Operational Security Assessment shall not worsen potentially existing operational security violations or create new operational security violations on the scanned elements more than a minimum threshold.
6. RCCs shall ensure that at the end of the Coordinated Regional Operational Security Assessment the loading of scanned elements meets the constraint defined under Annex 3(g). This ensures that, in case of overloads on scanned elements, the XRAs activated during the Coordinated Regional Operational Security Assessment do not induce a loading increase on these elements higher than a percentage Thr_e of their permanent thermal limit when compared to the initial day-ahead CGM referred to in Article 33(1)(a) of the CSAm.
7. The parameter Thr_e is set by default equal to 5% for all the scanned elements.
8. Under the request of the scanned element connecting TSO, for a given scanned element the value of the parameter Thr_e can be changed and set equal to:

- a. A value lower than 5% but higher than 0.5%, limited to an agreed amount of hours per month, subject to an unanimous yearly agreement of all TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties. Such amount of hours should reflect exceptional situations when operational security could be endangered;
 - b. Any value different than the default one referred to in paragraph 7, without any time limitation, subject to the unanimous agreement of all TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties.
9. The list of scanned elements shall contain all scanned elements defined pursuant to paragraph 11.
 10. Before the implementation of this methodology TSOs of Italy North and Technical Counterparties with the support of RCC(s) shall determine the list of scanned elements.
 11. When establishing and maintaining the list of scanned elements, each TSO of Italy North and Technical Counterparty shall have the right:
 - a. to include in the list of scanned elements any network element which is modelled in its IGM, is located in its control area, is excluded from the secured area and is not an overlapping XNE pursuant to the Amendment of the CSAm;
 - b. to include in the list of scanned elements any network element which is part of its observability area and is modelled in the CGM. The parameter Thr_e cannot be set below 5% for these elements;
 - c. to exclude any network element, located in its control area, from the list of scanned elements;
 - d. in case a network element from its control area is fulfilling the criteria for XNEs but is excluded pursuant to paragraph 3, to include this network element in the list of scanned elements;
 - e. to include in the list of scanned elements overlapping XNEs which are declared as XNEs in other CCRs subject to the unanimous agreement of all TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties.

Article 5

Procedure for exchanging the information between relevant TSOs and the RCC(s)

1. TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties shall make available to the RCC(s) the contingency list established according to the criteria defined in the CSAm.
2. On a yearly basis or when there is a significant change on the grid, the TSOs and Technical Counterparties of Italy North CCR shall reassess and update this contingency list and share it with RCCs and other TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties.
3. Each TSO of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparty shall manage exceptional contingencies inclusion information according to Article 11 of the CSAm.
4. TSOs of Italy North and Technical Counterparties shall share the list of scanned elements with RCC(s) for day-ahead and intraday Coordinated Regional Operational Security Assessment.
5. When receiving the list of scanned elements, the RCC(s) shall check that no overlapping XNE is added without a unanimous agreement as foreseen in Article 4.
6. In day-ahead timeframe, at latest at hour T0 defined in accordance with Article 45 of the CSAm or in intraday timeframe, before the starting time of each Coordinated Regional Operational Security Assessment defined in Article 7, each TSO shall provide to the relevant RCCs the last updated information on the transmission systems, including the following information:
 - a) the updated list of available RAs, among the categories listed in Article 22 of the SO Regulation, and their anticipated costs provided in accordance with RDCT Methodology and Article 18(3) of

the CSAm if a RA includes redispatching or countertrading, aimed at contributing to relieve any constraint identified in the Region;

- b) the operational security limits to fulfil Article 3 of this ROSC methodology.
7. In intraday timeframe, if a TSO is not able to provide to the relevant RCCs the updated information described in the previous paragraph, the RCC shall consider the latest available information previously submitted by this TSO.

Article 6 Creation of Individual Grid Models

1. For the day-ahead timeframe, each TSO of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparty shall build and deliver its IGM for at least each hour of the day of delivery, in accordance with the provisions of Article 21 of the Amendment of the CSAm and with the reference times referred to in Article 33 of CSAm.
2. When building the initial day-ahead IGM referred to in Article 33(1)(a) of the CSAm, in case of simultaneous commercial import of Italy on all its four northern borders (FR-IT, CH-IT, AT-IT, SI-IT), TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties shall include all the preventive remedial actions agreed for this scenario during the latest day-ahead capacity calculation process pursuant to the D-2 CCM.
3. When building the initial day-ahead IGM referred to in Article 33(1)(a) of the CSAm, in case Italy is not simultaneously commercially importing on all its four northern borders,
 - a) For at least the subsequent 18 months after the implementation of the export corner foreseen by the D-2 CCM and in general as long as the reliability of the export corner results is not deemed to be sufficient, TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties shall include preventive remedial actions in a way to reflect the existing operational agreements (e.g., PST procedure for the border SI-IT);
 - b) As soon as the reliability of the export corner results is accepted unanimously by all Italy North TSOs and Technical Counterparties, TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties shall include all the preventive remedial actions agreed for the export corner scenario during the latest day-ahead capacity calculation process pursuant to the common D-2 Italy North capacity calculation methodology developed in accordance with Article 21 of CACM Regulation.
4. For intraday timeframe, prior to each reference time referred to in Article 7, each TSO of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparty shall build and deliver an intraday IGM for at least each hour of the day of delivery between the reference time and the end of the business day, in accordance with the provisions of Article 21 of the Amendment of the CSAm.

Article 7 Timing of day-ahead and intraday Coordinated Regional Operational Security Assessment

1. TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties shall ensure or delegate to the RCC(s) their participation to the day-ahead Coordinated Regional Operational Security Assessment process starting at the reference time.
2. TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties shall ensure or delegate to the RCC(s) their participation to the intraday Coordinated Regional Operational Security Assessment process starting 45 minutes before the reference time.
3. The reference times for day-ahead timeframe are defined in the CSAm.
4. The reference times for intraday timeframe are defined in Annex 1.

5. The number of operational security assessments and the reference times referred to in paragraph 4 may be revised on a yearly basis, taking into account potential updates of the CGM methodology and subject to the agreement of the involved TSOs and communicated to NRAs of Italy North CCR and to the competent NRAs for Technical Counterparties.

Chapter 2

Remedial Actions cross-border relevance assessment

Article 8

General principles

1. Within one month after the list of XNEs has been defined in accordance with Article 4, TSOs shall share with the RCC(s) all potential RAs, designed in accordance with CSAm, which are at least sometimes able to address violations of current limits on XNEs..
2. All potential RAs identified pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be considered as cross-border relevant (XRAs), unless all TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties unanimously agree that a potential RA is not cross-border relevant.
3. Italy North TSOs and Technical Counterparties, in coordination with RCC(s), shall jointly assess the the TSO(s) affected by each XRA.
4. TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties shall aim at agreeing on a qualitative approach in accordance with Article 9 to complete the assessment mentioned in paragraph 3.
5. If the TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties cannot agree on a qualitative approach, a quantitative approach shall be used, in accordance with Article 10.
6. Prior to day-ahead or intraday operational planning, TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties may identify new RAs compared to those identified on an annual basis, according to the frequency established in Article 11. If a new RA is designed, its relevance is assessed using quantitative approach. The TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties shall delegate this task to the RCC(s).
7. A new RA activated during real time operation is by definition considered as cross-border relevant, unless the system is in emergency state and operational conditions do not allow it. The XRA connecting TSO or Technical Counterparty of Italy North CCR may propose to use the quantitative assessment in order to confirm the cross-border relevance of this may involve the RCC(s) in this process. RA influence factor computation for all the RAs described in this Article shall be performed on the last available CGM, according to Article 15(4) and 15(5) of the CSAm.

Article 9

Process for cross-border relevance assessment (qualitative approach)

1. TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties shall jointly establish a list of potential RAs, both preventive and curative, which are generally able to address operational security violations in the Region. These RAs are considered XRAs, unless differently agreed by the TSOs pursuant to this Article. Thelist should contain at least the RAs made available for the Capacity Calculation process.
2. For each potential RA in the list of paragraph 1:
 - a) Each TSO shall individually assess the influence of the RA on its XNEs;
 - b) The TSO owner of the RA shall also assess the influence of the RA on each other TSOs XNEs;

- c) For RAs that are quantifiable (e.g. PSTs, HVDC links or activation of redispatch and countertrading), the quantity above which this a TSO is deemed affected by this RAs has to be specified (for instance PST taps, HVDC setpoints or redispatching and countertrading volumes).
3. If an agreement is reached among all the TSOs affected by a given potential RA and the RA connecting TSO, then the RA is confirmed as cross-border relevant.
 4. If the RA connecting TSO receives no request from any other TSO to be determined as XRA affected TSO, the RA connecting TSO shall be the only XRA affected TSO.
 5. If an agreement on a RA cannot be reached, then the quantitative approach is used to assess the cross-border relevance of this RA.

Article 10

Process for cross-border relevance assessment (quantitative approach)

1. Quantitative approach shall be used to assess cross-border relevance of potential RAs only if no agreement can be reached on the cross-border relevance assessment of these RAs using qualitative approach.
2. Cross-border relevance of RAs shall be evaluated against the latest agreed state, which, for example, for the day-ahead Coordinated Regional Operational Security Assessment referred to in Article 33(1)(b) of the CSAm is represented by the grid state included in the initial day-ahead CGM referred to in Article 33(1)(a) of the CSAm.
3. For potential RAs included in the list of Article 8(1) or updated according to Article 11(2) Year-ahead CGMs developed in accordance with Article 67 of the SO Regulation shall be used for assessment of cross-border relevance in case an agreement cannot be reached based on qualitative assessment.
4. To assess the cross-border relevance of one RA quantitatively, the following process is defined:
 - a) TSOs shall provide a list of XNEs on which the influence of the RA shall be assessed;
 - b) RCC(s) calculate the influence of each RA on each XNE according to the RA influence factor defined in Article 15 of the CSAm;
 - c) For RAs that are quantifiable (e.g. PSTs, HVDC links or activation of redispatch and countertrading), the quantity above which this RA is deemed cross-border relevant has to be specified (for instance PST taps, HVDC setpoints or redispatching and countertrading volumes).
5. TSOs shall consider commonly agreed as cross-border relevant all the RAs for which the RA influence factor on at least one XNE is higher than 5%.
6. The XNE connecting TSO of an XNE impacted by an XRA identified according to paragraph 3 is considered as a TSO affected by this XRA.

Article 11

Frequency of update

1. TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties will share with the RCC(s) the agreed list of RAs that are deemed cross-border relevant and the list of affected TSOs for each XRA.
2. When there is a significant change on the grid or a new RA is designed prior to day-ahead operational planning or at least every 12 months, TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties shall update the list of XRAs in accordance with Article 8.

Chapter 3

Conditions of coordination of operational security assessment

Article 12

Day-ahead regional CSA and preparation of RAs

1. In accordance with Article 78 of the SO Regulation and in line with the reference times and processes defined in Article 33(1) of the CSAm, each day the appointed RCC(s) shall run the day-ahead Coordinated Regional Operational Security Assessment to check the security of the grid in accordance with Article 3.
2. The appointed RCC(s) shall perform the day-ahead Coordinated Regional Operational Security Assessment using the data listed in Article 5 and the CGM built in accordance with the all TSOs' proposal for a common grid model methodology in accordance with Articles 67(1) and 70(1) of SO Regulation.
3. The day-ahead Coordinated Regional Operational Security Assessment is performed by the appointed RCC(s) with the aim of:
 - a) Ensuring that, in accordance with Article 3, the operational security limits of all the network elements belonging to the secured area are respected according to the available CGM, taking into account the observation rule defined in Article 4 for the scanned elements;
 - b) Selecting in a coordinated way with the concerned TSOs the XRAs which allow the achievement of point a) with the minimum cost, based on the objective function reported in Annex 2.
4. Each day-ahead Coordinated Regional Operational Security Assessment shall cover all the 24 hours of the day of delivery.
5. While the appointed RCC(s) perform the assessment run referred to in Article 33(1)(b) of the CSAm, all available XRAs are optimised attempting to solve all the detected constraints on the network elements belonging to the secured area, taking into account the observation rule defined in Article 4 for the scanned elements. The TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties shall evaluate and agree on the recommended XRAs in accordance with the principles of Article 20 of SO Regulation and Article 14 of this Proposal.
6. TSOs, Technical Counterparties and RCC(s) of Italy North CCR will participate to the coordinated cross-regional operational security assessment in accordance with Article 30 and Article 33(1)(e) of the CSAm.
7. Taking into account the provisions of Article 33(1)(c) and (g) of the CSAm, each TSO of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparty shall implement all the agreed preventive XRAs in its subsequent IGMs in accordance with the requirements of the methodology developed according to Article 70(1) of SO Regulation. The list of all agreed XRAs, both preventive and curative, shall be logged and made accessible to all TSOs and RCCs, in line with the objectives of Article 41 of the CSAm.

Article 13

Intraday regional CSA and preparation of RAs

1. In accordance with Article 78 of the SO Regulation, each day the appointed RCC(s) shall run the intraday Coordinated Regional Operational Security Assessment to check the security of the grid in accordance with Article 3.
2. The appointed RCC(s) shall perform the intraday Coordinated Regional Operational Security Assessment using the data listed in Article 5 and the CGM built in accordance with the CGM methodology developed in accordance with Article 67(1) and 70(1) of the SO Regulation.

3. The intraday Coordinated Regional Operational Security Assessment is performed by the appointed RCC(s) with the aim of:
 - a) Ensuring that, in accordance with Article 3, the operational security limits of all the network elements belonging to the secured area are respected according to the available CGM, taking into account the observation rule defined in Article 4 for the scanned elements;
 - b) Selecting in a coordinated way with the concerned TSOs the XRAs which allow the achievement of point a) with the minimum cost, based on the objective function reported in Annex 2.
4. Each intraday Coordinated Regional Operational Security Assessment shall start 45 minutes before each reference time defined in Article 7(4) and cover every hour between the reference time and the end of the day.
5. As a first step, all the agreed but not ordered regional costly RAs resulting from the previous coordinated operational security analysis performed in Italy North CCR are removed from the CGM but are kept in the list of available XRAs unless made technical unavailable, in order to assess if more economically efficient XRAs can be found according to the latest available grid information.
6. After the application of paragraph 5 and in accordance with Article 3, a security analysis shall be performed on the CGM by the appointed RCC(s) in order to check the respect of the operational security limits of all the network elements belonging to the secured area:
 - a) If constraints are detected on one of these network elements, the curative non-costly agreed XRAs coming from the previous intraday Coordinated Regional Operational Security Assessment is implemented for each contingency to check whether it is sufficient to secure the grid;
 - b) If there is no previous intraday Coordinated Regional Operational Security Assessment, the curative non-costly agreed XRAs coming from the day-ahead Coordinated Regional Operational Security Assessment shall be used.
7. In case after the application of paragraph 6 there are still some violations of the operational security limits in accordance with Article 3, all available XRAs are optimised to solve all the detected constraints on the network elements belonging to the secured area, taking into account the observation rule defined in Article 4 for the scanned elements. The TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties shall evaluate and agree on the recommended XRAs in accordance with the principles of Article 20 of SO Regulation and Article 14 of this Proposal.
8. Each TSO of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparty shall implement all the agreed preventive RAs in its intraday IGM in accordance with the requirements of the methodology developed according to Article 70(1) of SO Regulation. The list of all agreed RAs, both preventive and curative, shall be logged and made accessible to all TSOs and RCCs, in line with the objectives of Article 41 of the CSAm.
9. When performing the intraday capacity calculation process pursuant to the common Italy North intraday capacity calculation methodology developed in accordance with Article 21 of CACM Regulation, the TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties shall take into account the activation of ordered RAs. The resulting capacities shall not aggravate the operational security.

Article 14

Coordination and validation of the remedial actions recommended by the RCC(s) to the relevant TSOs

1. In accordance with Article 78(4) of SO Regulation and Article 42(2) of Electricity Regulation, a XRAs recommended by the RCC(s) during the day-ahead and intraday Coordinated Regional Operational Security Assessment performed according to Article 12 and Article 13, shall be considered as agreed, except where it is rejected by:

- a) any XRA affected TSO (including XRA connecting TSOs) on the grounds that the implementation of a specific XRA would result in operational security violations;
 - b) XRA connecting TSO on the grounds that the recommended XRA is no longer available.
2. If a TSO rejects a recommended XRAs, it shall provide the RCCs and other TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties with clear reasons for rejection, including the evidence for the claimed grounds of rejection.

Article 15

Monitoring of inclusion of agreed Remedial Actions in the individual grid models

1. In line with Article 28 of the CSAm, each RCC shall monitor in the relevant timeframes the correct inclusion of the agreed XRAs in the IGMs by the TSOs, as required by Article 70(4) of the SO Regulation.
2. Additionally, each RCC shall monitor that the initial day-ahead IGM referred to in Article 33(1)(a) of the CSAm is built in accordance with the provisions of Article 6.
3. When a RCC identifies that a previously agreed XRA has not been included in the IGM by a TSO or that uncoordinated additional XRAs have been added, that RCC shall inform the other relevant RCCs about it. The RCC shall, in accordance with Article 79(3) of the SO Regulation, ask the relevant TSO to correct its IGM without undue delay in accordance with Article 6, Article 12 and Article 13 of this ROSC Proposal.

Article 16

Activation of Remedial Actions

1. For each hour, all the XRAs recommended by the RCC(s) and validated by the relevant TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties in accordance with Article 14 are considered the reference for the real time operations.
2. The activation of XRA impacting more than one TSO shall be coordinated among all the affected TSOs identified according to article 9 or 10.
3. Each TSO of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparty shall activate each of the XRAs referred to in paragraph 1, unless:
 - a) a XRA is not anymore available for proven technical reasons (e.g. outage); or
 - b) new XRAs are agreed by the affected TSOs for a given time period according to the real time conditions of the network; or
 - c) the difference between the XRAs referred to in paragraph 1 and the new XRAs are not considered cross-border relevant; or
 - d) a preventive XRA is agreed for a subsequent hour and, in accordance with Article 19(2) of the CSAm, is activated earlier than when it is necessary with consideration of the operational conditions and provided that it does not introduce any operational security limit violation.
4. XRAs referred to in paragraph 2(b), 2(c) or 2(d) shall be justified and communicated by the competent TSOs to the RCC.
5. In case one TSO of Italy North CCR or one Technical Counterparty detects and communicates that the new RAs referred to in paragraph 3(b), 3(c) or 3(d) are not ensuring anymore the grid security, the XRAs

referred to in paragraph 1 shall be activated, unless the fast activation process pursuant to Article 17 is activated and new RAs are agreed.

6. XRAs activated pursuant to paragraph 1, paragraph 2 and paragraph 4 shall be considered as coordinated actions.
7. Where a TSO refuses to activate any of the XRAs according to paragraph 3 and paragraph 4, the non-activation of the XRA(s) is considered as a non-coordinated action.
8. TSOs of Italy North CCR, Technical Counterparties and RCC(s) shall relieve operational security limits violations on overlapping XNEs and shall coordinate XRAs impacting these overlapping XNEs in accordance with the amendment of CSAm.

Article 17 **Fast activation process**

1. The fast activation process is a process that can be triggered in real-time or close to real-time, to relieve physical congestion due to sudden critical situations (such as, but not limited to, an unplanned outage in real time or a relevant forecast error), that lead to overloads on Italy North XNEs and requires fast actions, which cannot be effectively and promptly treated with the regular process described in Article 12 and Article 13 (e.g. critical situations detected between two regular assessment runs or after the last intraday run).
2. The fast activation process shall also be considered as a fallback where coordination through the RCC(s) is no longer possible due to insufficient time and the regular processes described in Article 12 and Article 13 could not be properly applied (e.g. missing data, tools failure).
3. In the fast activation process, the activation of preventive as well as curative XRAs may be designed.
4. In the fast activation process, each TSO of Italy North CCR or Technical Counterparty may activate XRAs in direct coordination with XRA affected TSO(s) considering also the provisions of Article 14.
5. In the fast activation process, TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties shall aim at activating all the available non-costly XRAs for relieving or reducing congestions on the XNEs before using costly measures. However, considering the application of this process should be very infrequent, being linked to extraordinary and unusual events, and that it must be characterized by fast activation, it may be possible that not all XRAs available are considered because there is not enough time to evaluate their impact.
6. While activating remedial actions in the fast activation process, TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties shall aim to avoid any aggravation of any constraints in the control areas of the TSOs not directly involved in the process.
7. In case the XRAs used in the fast activation process have an impact on TSO(s) outside the Italy North CCR pursuant to Article 27 of the CSAm as modified by ACER Decision 07-2021 on the Amendment of the Methodology for Coordinating Operational Security Analysis, the TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties shall inform the concerned TSO(s).
8. The TSO triggering the fast activation process shall ex-post provide the RCC(s) with all the relevant information on which the decision was based. The RCC(s) shall monitor occurrences of fast activation processes and the information provided by the relevant TSOs on those occurrences together with the regular reporting obligations from Article 17 of SO Regulation.
9. XRAs agreed among affected TSOs during the fast activation process shall be considered as coordinated RAs.

Article 18
Intraday regular regional security analysis

1. In addition to the intraday regional CSA described in Article 13, Italy North RCCs shall perform regular ID RSA.
2. The goal of the regular ID RSA is to provide TSOs of Italy North and Technical Counterparties each hour of the day with the latest information about the loading of the transmission system and previously undetected violations of operational security limits, which may serve as a trigger for a fast activation process.
3. This regular ID RSA shall be performed on hourly basis and cover every hour between the starting time and the end of the day.
4. ID RSA shall be performed on the latest available IGMs containing the latest available forecast of generation and load, planned and forced outages, Agreed XRAs and Ordered XRAs.
5. RCCs shall use the latest available CGMs to perform a load flow and contingency analysis calculation and deliver the results to all TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties.

Chapter 4
Sharing of the costs

Article 19
Sharing of costs for Remedial Actions

1. The costs incurred to relieve any congested element shall be subject to the principles established in accordance with the methodology developed under Article 74 of the CACM Regulation.
2. The methodology developed under Article 74 of the CACM Regulation shall include the following provisions for coordinated actions:
 - a) rules and/or criteria to establish the XNEs for which the costs attributed to them shall be shared among the involved TSOs and the XNEs for which the costs attributed to them shall be covered solely by the XNE connecting TSO(s);
 - b) a process to allocate the costs of XRAs to the XNEs;
 - c) rules to share the costs among the involved TSOs;
3. While allocating the costs on overlapping XNEs, the methodology shall be consistent with Article 27(17) of the Amendment of the CSAm even for the costs arising during the period after the implementation of this ROSC methodology and before the implementation of the cross-regional coordination referred to in Article 27(18) of the Amendment of the CSAm.
4. The methodology developed under Article 74 of the CACM Regulation shall also include rules for the allocation of costs for non-coordinated actions.

Chapter 5

Remedial Actions optimisation

Article 20

General principles

1. The objective of the XRAs optimisation is the identification of the most cost-efficient combination of XRAs, which will solve all the constraints detected on the XNEs during each run of the Coordinated Regional Operational Security Assessment.

Article 21

Objective function

1. The objective function shall aim at minimizing the overall costs for Italy North CCR resulting from the activation of the costly XRAs needed to solve the constraints detected during each run of the Coordinated Regional Operational Security Assessment.
2. The definition of the objective function is detailed in Annex 2.
3. The XRAs obtained pursuant to the objective function defined in paragraph 2 shall also be the most efficient ones in terms of number of actions to be activated.

Article 22

Constraints

1. During the optimisation process, at least the following technical constraints shall be considered:
 - a) balance of the activated redispatching and countertrading resources;
 - b) lead time for activation of a XRA;
 - c) operational security limit on all the elements belonging to the secured area;
 - d) only XRAs that have an influence on the respective constraints higher than a certain threshold can be used during RAO;
 - e) maximum number of preventive and curative XRAs per TSO, Region and timestamp;
 - f) PSTs' tap positions, PST flow, HVDC set point and HVDC power flow inside the available range;
 - g) operational security limit on all the elements belonging to the scanned element list.

More details about the aforementioned constraints are given in Annex 3.

2. The TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties will assess during the implementation of this ROSC Proposal the need to consider intertemporal constraints in RAO in order to ensure consistency of results.

Article 23

Optimisation variables

1. During Remedial Actions optimisation the following optimisation variables shall be considered:
 - a) Switching states of topological measures;
 - b) Adjustment of PSTs tap position;
 - c) Operating mode of HVDC (Set-Point/AC Emulation);
 - d) AC emulation Parameters when HVDC is operating in AC emulation mode;

- e) HVDC set point when HVDC is operating in set-point mode;
 - f) Amount and localization of countertrading and redispatching.
2. Topological measures are defined as follows:
- a) Opening or closing one or more line(s), cable(s), transformer(s), busbar coupler(s); or
 - b) Switching one or more network element(s) from one busbar to another, in case of non-explicit modelling of busbar couplers.

Article 24

Other functionalities of Remedial Actions Optimisation

1. The XRAs optimisation shall support the following operating modes for the PSTs:
- a) Tap mode (the result of the optimisation is the tap number);
 - b) Target flow mode (the result of the optimisation is the flow on the PST).

TITLE 3
Appointment, governance and task allocation of the RCC(s)

Article 25
Appointment of RCCs and task allocation

1. Being established as competent Regional Coordination Centres for the Central System Operation Region where Italy North CCR is placed, CORESO and TSCNET shall perform the tasks listed in Article 37 of the Electricity .
2. TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties shall delegate the following tasks to CORESO and TSCNET, which shall be performed in a transparent and non-discriminatory manner:
 - a) Regional operational security coordination in accordance with Article 37(1)(b) of the Electricity Regulation in order to support Italy North TSOs to fulfil their obligations for the year-ahead, day-ahead and intraday timeframes in accordance with Articles 34(3), 72 and 74 of SO Regulation;
 - b) Building of common grid model in accordance with Article 37(1)(c) of the Electricity Regulation;
 - c) Regional outage planning coordination in accordance with Article 37(1)(f) of the Electricity Regulation;
 - d) Regional adequacy assessment in accordance with Article 37(1)(e) of the Electricity Regulation.
3. The tasks mentioned in paragraph 2 shall be executed by CORESO and TSCNET according to the relevant provisions mentioned in SO Regulation.

Article 26
Allocation of tasks between RCCs

1. CORESO and TSCNET shall carry out the task for regional operational security coordination in accordance with Article 78 of SO Regulation on a rotational basis over a pre-determined period as defined in paragraph 2.
2. The rotational basis assumes that CORESO and TSCNET shall rotate the roles of Leading and Backup RCC over pre-determined periods which shall be determined in accordance with Article 10(5) of Provisions for establishment of regional coordination centres for the Central Europe System Operation Region in accordance with Article 35 of the Electricity Regulation (hereafter referred to as “Central RCC Establishment Provisions”). The Leading RCC shall be responsible and accountable for the effective and efficient execution of the regional operational security coordination in accordance with Article 78 of SO Regulation over a pre-determined period. The Backup RCC shall be responsible for supporting the Leading RCC to ensure the effectiveness of the regional operational security coordination process for all the TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties. This support can be either requested by the Leading RCC or suggested by the Backup RCC.
3. CORESO and TSCNET shall carry out the task of common grid model building in a pan-European process on the basis of a pan-European rotation principle agreed at ENTSO-E level. The principles of the pan-European rotation for building of CGM are defined in Article 17 of Central RCC Establishment Provisions.
4. TSCNET shall carry out the task of outage planning coordination for the pan-European process within a pan-European rotation with RCCs established in other SORs and for regional processes related to Italy North outage coordination region. The principles of the pan-European rotation for outage planning coordination are described in Article 18 of Central RCC Establishment Provisions.
5. CORESO shall carry out the task of regional week ahead to at least day-ahead system adequacy forecasts and preparation of risk reducing actions for the pan-European process within a pan-European rotation

with RCCs established in other SORs and for all the regional processes related to Italy North CCR. The principles of the pan-European rotation for system adequacy forecasts are described in Article 19 of Central RCC Establishment Provisions.

6. The organization of the regional outage coordination task and of the regional adequacy assessment task in (4) and (5) may be amended in accordance with Article 27 and Article 28.

Article 27

Efficiency and effectiveness of the allocation of tasks between RCCs

1. CORESO and TSCNET shall monitor the effectiveness and efficiency of the allocation of the tasks for which they are responsible and, where applicable, the rotation arrangements of those tasks and their operational performance on a yearly basis in the scope of preparation of the annual reports on regional coordination assessment according to Article 17 of SO Regulation.
2. CORESO and TSCNET shall agree on clear and specific performance indicators with the TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties to perform the tasks referred to in paragraphs 1 and 4 of this article and to assess the performance of the tasks referred to in Article 26.
3. CORESO and TSCNET will ensure, based on the instructions of the TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties, transparency and interoperability of all processes and their associated data within the operational tasks mentioned in this methodology.
4. CORESO and TSCNET shall assess interoperability issues to allow the TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties to propose changes aiming at improving effectiveness and efficiency in the system operation coordination.

Article 28

Coordination and decision-making process

1. The Leading RCC with the support of the Backup RCC shall ensure the coordination with all the TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties.
2. RCCs shall cooperate in good faith and shall seek to adopt a fair and loyal treatment of the Parties concerned.
3. RCCs shall implement the provision of the tasks in close consultation and cooperation with the TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties.
4. RCCs, TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties shall establish a contractual framework for the implementation of this methodology.

Article 29

Rules concerning governance and operation of RCCs

1. The security of supply shall be the responsibility of each of the TSO of Italy North CCR and the Technical Counterparty according to national laws and regulations. The responsibility for secure system operation and any decision taken based on services from CORESO and TSCNET shall remain with the TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties.
2. For the avoidance of doubt, these rules do not replace any provision of national or European law that may apply to any of the TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties. The provisions of these rules shall be complementary and interpreted in accordance with the applicable regulations. In case of contradictions between these rules and the applicable laws and regulations, the provisions of these rules shall be amended accordingly.

3. The organisational and operational arrangements shall be defined in accordance with Article 5 of Central RCC Establishment Provisions.
4. The rules concerning the governance of RCCs are established in accordance with Article 8 of Central RCC Establishment Provisions. The liability of the RCCs is defined in the article 14 of Central RCC Establishment Provisions.

TITLE 4
Publication, implementation of the proposal and monitoring

Article 30
Timescale for publication of the proposal

1. In accordance with Article 8(1) of the SO Regulation the TSOs of Italy North CCR shall publish on their website this ROSC methodology without undue delay after the approval by the NRAs of Italy North CCR.

Article 31
Timescale for implementation of the proposal

1. The implementation of this ROSC methodology is subject to:
 - a) Approval by the relevant national regulatory authorities of a version of the common Italy North methodology for coordinated redispatching and countertrading cost sharing pursuant to Article 74 of the CACM Regulation consistent with the provision of Article 19;
 - b) Development, testing and readiness of the IT tools, systems and procedures required to implement the Italy North ROSC methodology, CGM Exchange Standards format and amendments of the CSAm.
2. In the implementation of this ROSC methodology, the TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties shall consider the following steps for the condition referred to in paragraph 1(b):
 - a) High level business solution consisting among others of identification of the contractual needs between the TSOs of Italy North CCR, Technical Counterparties and RCCs, drafting of the business process, performing the gap analysis with the current situation, screening the market for potential solution to fill the gaps and drafting related business, IT and service level requirements for tools and hardware and determining the acceptance criteria for validating the accuracy and robustness of the solution;
 - b) Tendering consisting in preparing and performing the selection and contracting of the vendors for the different tools and hardware solution identified in the step (a), in case this is required;
 - c) Development of the first step of the target solution focusing on linear RAs without full optimisation functionality, including the respective specification and design phase, negotiation of performance requirements, Functional Acceptance Test, Site Acceptance Test and User Acceptance Test. The purpose of this first step of the target solution shall be to provide early testing and will therefore not go live;
 - d) Development of the second step of the target solution with full optimisation functionality and non-linear RAs, including the specification and design phase, negotiation of performance requirements, Functional Acceptance Test, Site Acceptance Test and User Acceptance Test;
 - e) Experimentation of the first step of the target solution by TSOs of Italy North CCR, Technical Counterparties and RCCs experts and key users aiming at tuning the different parameters to ensure accuracy and robustness of the solution towards the acceptance criteria defined in the step (a);
 - f) Experimentation of the second step of the target solution by TSOs of Italy North CCR, Technical Counterparties and RCCs experts and key users aiming at tuning the different parameters to ensure accuracy and robustness of the solution towards the acceptance criteria defined in the step (a);
 - g) Parallel operational run for the target solution, after completing both steps, where TSOs of Italy North CCR, Technical Counterparties and RCCs will train their operators and perform operational

- runs in parallel with the existing operational processes to assess the accuracy and robustness of the solution towards the acceptance criteria defined in step (a);
- h) Go-Live of the target solution, where the solution will replace the existing operational processes.
3. TSOs of Italy North CCR, Technical Counterparties and RCCs shall respect the following maximum timing for the different implementation steps defined in the paragraph 2:
 - a) Step 2(a) shall be completed at the latest by 3 months after the approval of this ROSC methodology;
 - b) Step 2(b) shall be completed at the latest by 6 months after the completion of step 2(a);
 - c) Step 2(c) shall be completed at the latest by 18 months after the completion of step 2(b);
 - d) Step 2(d) shall be completed at the latest by 16 months after the completion of step 2(c);
 - e) Step 2(e) shall be completed at the latest by 6 months after the completion of step 2(c);
 - f) Step 2(f) shall be completed at the latest by 4 months after the completion of step 2(d);
 - g) Step 2(g) shall be completed at the latest by 6 months after the completion of step 2(f);
 - h) Step 2(h) shall be completed at the latest by 1 months after the completion of step 2(g).
 4. TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties, with the support of the RCCs, shall aim at regularly identifying the common functions and tools referred to in paragraph 1(e). All TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties, with the support of the RCCs, shall:
 - a) Decide on their development;
 - b) Provide for the needed budgets for their tendering, development and maintenance;
 - c) Agree on the rules applicable for the management of the development and maintenance, including evolutions.
 5. If an alignment between the RDCT methodology and the ROSC methodology is deemed necessary, by two years from the approval of this ROSC methodology, all TSOs of Italy North CCR with the support of the RCCs shall submit an amendment of the RDCT methodology to align it to the principles included in the ROSC methodology.
 6. Before the implementation of this methodology pursuant to paragraph 1, 2 and 3, TSOs and Technical Counterparties shall keep coordinating the activation of remedial actions, including countertrading and redispatching resources, according to the agreed operational procedures in force (e.g. pentilateral and trilateral procedure).
 7. Until 30th June 2022 all tasks and activities listed in Article 77(3) of SO GL shall be executed by CORESO and TSCNET as appointed Regional Security Coordinators for Italy North CCR, on the basis of the procedures established pursuant to the previous version of the ROSC methodology as approved by the relevant national regulatory authorities on 24th July 2020.

Article 32

Monitoring

1. TSOs of the Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties shall deliver to the national regulatory authorities of Italy North CCR and to the competent national regulatory authorities for Technical Counterparties on a three-month basis information on the monitoring of the regional CSA process, starting after the implementation of this ROSC methodology, and at the latest 10 days into the following three-month period.
2. TSOs of the Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties can delegate the task of preparing the information referred to in paragraph 1 to the RCCs.
3. The information referred to in paragraph 1 shall at least include:

- a) the occasions when the fast activation process was triggered by any TSO of the Italy North CCR or Technical Counterparty and the relevant justification;
- b) the number of errors/incomplete data in exchanging the information referred in Articles 5(6) and 5(7), and the relevant justification;
- c) the number of occurrences of RCC request to each TSO to update IGM according Article 15(3)¹ and the outcome of each request;
- d) the number of initial day-ahead IGMs by TSO built based on the full import scenarios and the number of IGMs built with different criteria according to Articles 6(2) and 6(3);
- e) the number of occurrences of delivering a corrupt/incomplete IGM per timeframe, per TSO;
- f) the number of XRAs, per timeframe, recommended by the RCCs and rejected by the TSOs, with the relevant justification;
- g) the number of occurrences and XNEs, per timeframe, where it was not possible to solve all the overloads during the CROSA;
- h) the total amount of costs, per timeframe and timestamp, forecasted for the activation of the costly XRAs agreed during the CROSA;
- i) Initial XNEs and scanned elements for each timestamp per TSO;
- j) the list of XRAs for each timestamp and their number of recommendations, orders and activations, and update after any change.

¹ Agreed XRA not included in the IGM

TITLE 5
Final provisions

Article 33
Language

1. The reference language for this ROSC methodology shall be English.
2. For the avoidance of doubt, where TSOs need to translate this proposal into their national language(s), in the event of inconsistencies between the English version published by TSOs in accordance with Article 8(1) of the SO Regulation and any version in another language, the relevant TSOs shall, in accordance with national legislation, provide the relevant national regulatory authorities with an updated translation of the proposal.

Annex 1

1. The reference times for intraday timeframe shall be 00:00h, 08:00h and 16:00h.
2. The reference times are chosen in line with the CGM methodology and in such a way to ensure the availability of the latest updated IGMs on pan-European level.

Annex 2

The objective function referred to in Article 21 shall be defined as follows:

$$f_{obj} = \min (f_{obj}) \sum_{time\ steps} \mathbf{p}_{RD} + \mathbf{p}_{PST} + \mathbf{p}_{topo}$$

subject to the constraints listed in Article 22 (further detailed in Annex 3), where:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{p}_{RD} &= \sum \Delta P_i^{RD} \cdot c_i^{RD} \\ \mathbf{p}_{PST} &= \Delta Tap^{+PST} \cdot c^{PST} + \Delta Tap^{-PST} \cdot c^{PST} \\ \mathbf{p}_{topo} &= \mathbf{TOPO}^{change} \cdot c^{TOPO} \end{aligned}$$

- a) i is a generic redispatching or countertrading resource;
- b) ΔP_i^{RD} is the activated amount of the resource i [MW];
- c) c_i^{RD} is the cost of the redispatching or countertrading resource i [€/MW];
- d) j is a generic secured element;
- e) ΔTap_k^{+PST} is the positive change in taps of PST k [tap]
- f) ΔTap_k^{-PST} is the negative change in taps of PST k [tap]
- g) c^{PST} is the penalty cost associated to the change of the PST taps [€/tap] (small value)
- h) $TOPO_1^{change}$ is a binary value representing the change of the switch l
 - Change 0-1 à $TOPO_1^{change} = 1$
 - Change 1-0 à $TOPO_1^{change} = 1$
 - No change 0-0 à $TOPO_1^{change} = 0$
 - No change 1-1 à $TOPO_1^{change} = 0$
- i) c^{TOPO} is the penalty cost associated to each change of a topological action [€] (small value)

In order to not affect the capability of the RAO to find the solution associated to the lowest cost, the parameters c^{PST} and c^{TOPO} will have a small value compared to the cost $\sum \Delta P_i^{RD} \cdot c_i^{RD}$, so that they will become relevant only when such cost will be zero or very close to it.

Annex 3

More details about, the constraints defined in Article 22 are given below:

- a) balance of the activated redispatching and countertrading resources:

$$\sum \Delta P_i = 0$$

Where:

- ΔP_i is the activated amount of the resource i;

- b) lead time for activation of a RA:

$$t_i < T_{activation} - T_0$$

Where:

- t_i is the lead time of RA i;
- T_0 is the run of the regional CSA;
- $T_{activation}$ is the T time for which the RA is activated;

- c) operational security limit on the elements belonging to the secured area;

$$P_e + \Delta P_{e,preventive} + \Delta P_{e,curative} \leq PATL_e, \forall e \in XNEs$$

$$P_e + \Delta P_{e,preventive} \leq TATL_e, \forall e \in XNEs$$

Where:

- P_e is the power flow on the element e (it may be in N or N-1 situation depending on the congestion detected) before the application of the RAs used during the RAO, assumed positive;
- ΔP_e is the effect of the RAs used during the RAO, either preventive or curative;
- $TATL_e$ is the temporarily admissible transmission loading on the element e, assumed positive;
- $PATL_e$ is the permanently admissible transmission loading on the element e, assumed positive;

- d) only RAs that have an influence on the respective active constraints higher than a certain threshold can be used during the RAO:

$$IF_{RA\ Constraint} \geq MinIF$$

Where:

- $IF_{RA\ Constraint}$ is the influence factor of a RA on a given constraint;
- $MinIF$ is the minimum influence which the RA can have on the given constraint that will be commonly defined by the TSOs of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparties based on operational experience to ensure the RAO performances are in line with the operational time constraints of the CROSA;

- e) maximum number of preventive and curative RAs per TSO, Region and timestamp:

$$\begin{aligned} Number\ PRA_{TSO} &\leq Max\ PRA\ Limit_{TSO} \\ Number\ PRA_{REGION} &\leq Max\ PRA\ Limit_{REGION} \\ Number\ CRA_{TSO} &\leq Max\ CRA\ Limit_{TSO} \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{Number CRA}_{REGION} \leq \text{Max CRA Limit}_{REGION}$$

Where:

- Number PRA_{TSO} is the number of Preventive RA which are in a set after optimisation per TSO;
 - Number PRA_{REGION} is the number of Preventive RA which are in a set after optimisation for the whole Italy North CCR;
 - Max PRA Limit_{TSO} is the maximum number of Preventive RA that can be used for one TSO during the RAO that will be defined by each TSO of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparty based on operational experience and its national security policy;
 - Max PRA Limit_{REGION} is the maximum number of Preventive RA that can be used for the whole Italy North CCR during the RAO that will be defined by each TSO of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparty based on operational experience and its national security policy;
 - Number CRA_{TSO} is the number of Curative RA which are in a set after optimisation per TSO;
 - Number CRA_{REGION} is the number of Curative RA which are in a set after optimisation for the whole Italy North CCR;
 - Max CRA Limit_{TSO} is the maximum number of Curative RA that can be used for one TSO during the RAO that will be defined by each TSO of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparty based on operational experience and its national security policy;
 - Max CRA Limit_{REGION} is the maximum number of Curative RA that can be used for the whole Italy North CCR during the RAO that will be defined by each TSO of Italy North CCR and Technical Counterparty based on operational experience and its national security policy;
- f) PSTs' tap positions, PST flow, HVDC set point and HVDC power flow inside the available range:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{TAP}_{p,\min} &\leq \text{TAP}_p \leq \text{TAP}_{p,\max} \forall p \in \text{available PSTs} \\ \text{PSTflow}_{p,\min} &\leq \text{PSTflow}_p \leq \text{PSTflow}_{p,\max} \forall p \in \text{available PSTs} \\ \text{HVDC}_{h,\min} &\leq \text{HVDC}_h \leq \text{HVDC}_{h,\max} \forall h \in \text{HVDCs} \\ \text{HVDC}_{g,\min} &\leq \text{HVDC}_g \leq \text{HVDC}_{g,\max} \forall h \in \text{HVDCs} \end{aligned}$$

Where:

- TAP_p is the PST's tap position;
- TAP_{p,max} is the maximum PST's tap position available for that PST;
- TAP_{p,min} is the minimum PST's tap position available for that PST;
- PSTflow_p is the PST's target flow;
- PSTflow_{p,max} is the maximum PST's target flow available for that PST;
- PSTflow_{p,min} is the minimum PST's target flow available for that PST;
- HVDC_h is the HVDC's set point, when HVDC is operating in set point mode;
- HVDC_{h,max} is the maximum HVDC's set point available for that HVDC, when operating in set point mode;
- HVDC_{h,min} is the minimum HVDC's set point available for that HVDC, when operating in set point mode;
- HVDC_g is the HVDC's power flow, when HVDC is operating in AC emulating mode;
- HVDC_{g,max} is the maximum HVDC's power flow, when operating in AC emulating mode;

- $HVDC_{g,\min}$ is the minimum HVDC's power flow, when operating in AC emulating mode.

The same constraints can be also expressed in relative terms.

- g) operational security limit on the elements belonging to the scanned element list;

$$P_e + \Delta P_{e,\text{preventive}} + \Delta P_{e,\text{curative}} \leq \max(\text{PATL}_e, P_e + Thr_e \cdot \text{PATL}_e), \forall e \in \text{scanned elements}$$

Where:

- P_e is the power flow on the element e (it may be in N or $N-1$ situation depending on the congestion detected) before the application of the RAs used during the RAO, assumed positive;
- ΔP_e is the effect of the RAs used during the RAO, either preventive or curative;
- PATL_e is the permanently admissible transmission loading on the element e , assumed positive.
- Thr_e is the parameter defined in Article 4.